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Wittgenstein and philosophy
pp. 253-260
Abstrakt
Despite his avowed anti-essentialism, Wittgenstein is an essentialist — about philosophy itself. "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday." (P.I. 38) The philosopher takes a phrase from its home, working environment and idles with it. For example, he asks "Does the fact that when in the past I have touched things which are red hot, I have been burned, provide any reason, grounds, evidence for thinking that that will happen again?" Unable to see how what has happened in the past can provide any guide to what may happen in the future — without making an assumption that begs the question — he concludes that it cannot. Of course, his philosophical scepticism has no consequences for the philosopher's behaviour, i.e., he is as reluctant as anyone else to touch fires, glowing hot-plates, etc. (— and if he were not, he would be mad.) So, the verbal expression of his "philosophical", i.e., quite unreal doubt, is mere verbal play.
Publication details
Published in:
Haller Rudolf, Brandl Johannes L (1990) Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation: Akten des 14. internationalen Wittgenstein-symposiums feier des 100. geburtstages 13. bis 20. august 1989 kirchberg am wechsel (Österreich) / proceedings of the 14th international Wittgenstein-symposium centenary celebration 13th to 20th au. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 253-260
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-30086-2_24
Referenz:
Radford Colin (1990) „Wittgenstein and philosophy“, In: R. Haller & J.L. Brandl (eds.), Wittgenstein — eine neubewertung/Wittgenstein — towards a re-evaluation, Dordrecht, Springer, 253–260.