Repository | Series | Buch | Kapitel
Truth
pp. 106-121
Abstrakt
In the previous two chapters we discussed the possibilities and limitations of approaches to capturing necessary truth. Are there some analogous ways of capturing truth simpliciter? After all, necessary truth seems to be a subspecies, a special case of truth — is not every account for necessary truth thus a special case of a general theory, which would yield truth simpliciter as another special case?
Publication details
Published in:
Peregrin Jaroslav (1995) Doing worlds with words: formal semantics without formal metaphysics. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 106-121
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8468-5_6
Referenz:
Peregrin Jaroslav (1995) Truth, In: Doing worlds with words, Dordrecht, Springer, 106–121.