Max Scheler
Gesellschaft

Repository | Buch | Kapitel

210073

Perspectivism

Katrina Mitcheson

pp. 42-58

Abstrakt

The question of truth's value, the form that truth must take in order to overcome the ascetic ideal, and the transformative potential of self-knowledge, continue to occupy Nietzsche throughout his philosophical career. In his later work, Nietzsche reaffirms his rejection of the idea of an itself, which is free from our contribution to experience and possesses content that is not projected onto it. A metaphysical conception of truth is inherently empty and bound to the ascetic ideal. If, therefore, we are to answer the question of truth's value positively, this conception of truth must be overcome. Nietzsche does not attempt to disprove the possibility that there is a reality distinct from how we experience it; but this inherently unverifiable, inaccessible possibility cannot continue to serve as the goal of our truth practice.

Publication details

Published in:

Mitcheson Katrina (2013) Nietzsche, truth and transformation. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Seiten: 42-58

DOI: 10.1057/9781137357069_3

Referenz:

Mitcheson Katrina (2013) Perspectivism, In: Nietzsche, truth and transformation, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 42–58.