The question we now have to consider is, What is the specific feature of Maimon's skepticism? It would seem at first thought that Maimon's conception concerning the application of the principle of causality to particular phenomena of experience as being based on induction, which can lead only to probability, does not supersede the skepticism of Hume, who maintains that any statement as to a causal connection between phenomena is nothing other than the result of habit and custom. In what sense, then, is Maimon's skepticism different from that of Hume, and what is its relation to the various schools of skepticism as they have evolved in the history of human thought? The consideration of this question has relevance for contemporary thought. "Logical positivism" and cognate schools of thought prevalent in our time maintain that any statement of a causal connection between the phenomena of experience, and for that matter, any synthetic proposition, can claim only probability, no certainty. In what sense, then, is Maimon's skepticism different?