The problem of the concept of the thing-in-itself (Ding an sich) in Kant's thought, its meaning and significance, became the pivotal point of philosophical thinking in the period immediately following the appearance of Kant's Critique. All the discussions and arguments in the various philosophical schools revolved around this concept, and Maimon's philosophy was no exception. Maimon attacked the problem of the thing-in-itself in a variety of contexts and from several different angles. Not satisfied with proving the untenability of the concept in a critical system of thought, as Jacobi and Schulze had already done, he attempted to define its positive meaning in critical philosophy. If the thing-in-itself is understood to mean, as it usually is, an object independent of a thinking subject, then it is just as contradictory as the concept of a squared circle. It is tantamount to stating that we can imagine something that is in principle unimaginable, or that we can be conscious of something that in principle transcends all consciousness. As it is impossible to know something that is in principle unknowable, and as it is inconceivable for the subject to have an idea of an object that cannot be brought within the sphere of comprehension of the subject, the thing-in-itself is an illogical concept. Our task, therefore, is to explain the origin of this self-contradictory concept in our mind by positively establishing its meaning and rightful place in the realm of consciousness.