In the previous chapter I began to gather reflections on the aetiology of philosophical paradoxes, with a view to imposing some sort of order upon them. I suggested that in any particular case, there are likely to be numerous factors operating at different levels that together make up a "mindset" out of which paradoxical conclusions eventually emerge. Unfortunately, some of these factors are unavoidable (e.g. the lack of coercive evidence, the lack of agreed methodology, the breadth of the discipline, the nature of coordination problems, the nature of our evolutionarily endowed cognitive capacities). Others have their origin in avoidable but particularly philosophical thought patterns (e.g. category mistakes, mistaken or faulty analogies, failure to recognise relevant distinctions, faulty conceptual analyses, inappropriate application of the appearance/reality distinction, employing a method outside its realm of competence). I also noted that certain non-rational factors were likely to be a feature of a disordered mindset (e.g. there were what we might call "Humean weaknesses", bad faith, the clever person's propensity to place too much store in pet arguments).