Repository | Series | Buch | Kapitel
The tradition of legal positivism in modern legal thought
pp. 57-71
Abstrakt
Why do jurists and officials consider certain norms/rules as legally binding? How is it possible for officials to insist that their role is not to question the political wisdom or substantive moral content of norms/rules? Why do lawyers and judges, to be more specific, observe from the sidelines, as it were, as if their norms/rules were impersonal and their decisions distanced?
Publication details
Published in:
Conklin William E (2001) The invisible origins of legal positivism: a re-reading of a tradition. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 57-71
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0808-2_4
Referenz:
Conklin William E (2001) The tradition of legal positivism in modern legal thought, In: The invisible origins of legal positivism, Dordrecht, Springer, 57–71.