Continuing on from the preceding chapter, it is fair to say that Foucault's trajectory of thought on the Enlightenment is one that oscillates, best demonstrated at this juncture by a problematic 1978 interview first published in 1980 (DÉ281). Perhaps as a consequence of the flux in his thought at this point, Foucault essentially reverts here to a straightforward repetition of the Weberian-inflected, early Frankfurt School mantra: "[c]ouldn't it be concluded that the Enlightenment's promise of attaining freedom through the exercise of reason has been turned upside down, resulting in domination by reason itself, which increasingly usurps the place of freedom?"¹ Clearly, this view has a strong resonance with Foucault's earliest, unproblematised stance on the Enlightenment, but it is now entwined within a fluctuating field of geographically and temporally specific complications.