Francis Bacon, widely appreciated as the father of the experimental method in science, proposed that science is inductive. Popper put critical testing of hypotheses against empirical evidence at the center of his epistemology, thereby excluding the act of conceiving or inventing a hypothesis or theory from his logical analysis of science. Michael Polanyi considered science as a social system based on epistemic authority and apprenticeship, stressing the informal and personal aspects of science. Using cases from genetics, embryology, molecular biology, and genomics, this essay (i) shows that induction, scientific authority and critical theory testing have been integral parts of scientific practice in the history of modern biology since the nineteenth century. This is despite the fact that a rigid adherence to Popper's principle of falsifiability is irreconcilable with scientific practice. (ii) analyzes the change of epistemology within recent developments in biology, particularly big data genomics. In these induction plays a major role while Polanyi's notions of epistemic authority and apprenticeship as well as Popper's principles of hypothesis, prediction and experimental testing are largely marginalized. The consequences of their disregard are discussed.