It is clear that within Deleuze's and Whitehead's work there is an important redescription of the time, place and status of all subjectivity, a subjectivity that is not limited to the "human". Both writers provide compelling reasons as to why and how contemporary analyses should avoid positing the human person as either an object or a subject. Rather, "human" individuality is to be envisaged as an aspect within the wider, processual effectivity whereby the virtual becomes actual (Deleuze), or the solidarity of the extensive continuum becomes actualized into individuality (Whitehead). It may appear that I am eliding or confusing the distinction between subjectivity and individuality here. However, one of the arguments I wish to set out in this chapter is that the validity and complexity of such a distinction can be helpfully rethought through a sustained engagement with the work of Whitehead and Deleuze.