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Non-pure synthetic a priori judgments in the "critique of pure reason"
pp. 246-254
Abstrakt
The arguments put forward in this paper attempt to show the relevance of a remark of Kant's on the propositional content of the principle of causality and the structure of the Analogies of Experience. This remark, though marking a decisive point in Kant's transcendental theory of experience, has not been dealt with adequately by Kantian scholars. Consequently, to some of them the very title of this paper may appear to contradict what they regard as basic Kantian doctrine. This paper attempts to prove that what may seem to contradict basic Kantian assertions is a basic, though problematic, Kantian assertion itself.
Publication details
Published in:
White Beck Lewis (1972) Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress: held at the university of rochester, march 30–april 4, 1970. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 246-254
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3099-1_18
Referenz:
Cramer Konrad (1972) „Non-pure synthetic a priori judgments in the "critique of pure reason"“, In: L. White Beck (ed.), Proceedings of the Third international Kant congress, Dordrecht, Springer, 246–254.