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Verification
pp. 162-170
Abstrakt
We have denied the existence of a special experience of 'self-evidence", which infallibly points out to us the truth of a true sentence. The question then arises naturally: Through which data of consciousness may truth then be recognized? What is the criterion that assures us of truth? This question we have not yet answered directly; but we posses all the data required to do so.
Publication details
Published in:
Schlick Moritz (1974) General theory of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 162-170
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_21
Referenz:
Schlick Moritz (1974) Verification, In: General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, 162–170.