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On self-evidence
pp. 147-151
Abstrakt
The foregoing considerations have clarified the problems of pure thought by answering the question: What are the special features of mental processes through which we obtain unmistakable insight into the truth of judgments that rest on the analysis of concepts? In our discussion, we have often had to overcome widely shared preconceptions that prevent us from understanding the true state of affairs. In retrospect and as a summary, we wish to place our results in still clearer view by seeking to eliminate once and for all those fundamental errors that have constantly cast shadows across these problems and have obscured the ideas about consciousness entertained by philosophers, both ancient and modern.
Publication details
Published in:
Schlick Moritz (1974) General theory of knowledge. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 147-151
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-7091-3099-5_19
Referenz:
Schlick Moritz (1974) On self-evidence, In: General theory of knowledge, Dordrecht, Springer, 147–151.