The purpose of this chapter is to articulate a hermeneutic notion of meaning that corresponds to the conception of experience and understanding that I have described so far. A central motivation for explicating the world-involving dimension of language through McDowell's reading of Kant and Hegel is that he does not propound an apophantic or propositional account of perception. Such an account would be irreconcilable with philosophical hermeneutics, because Gadamer, following Heidegger, views the idea that meaning can be objectified in propositions as a symptom of metaphysical prejudice. Recently, McDowell has explicitly modified his position on this point – he now recommends viewing the content of perception as conceptual, but specifically denies that it is propositional. In this way, he claims to avoid the Myth of the Given without committing himself to a picture in which our perception is parcelled out, so to speak, in propositional structures. This chapter therefore aims to reconstruct Gadamer's hermeneutic account of meaning in order to show how it aligns with McDowell's revised position.