Mill's fullest account of the nature of the external world and of the relation to it of the knowing subject is to be found in the eleventh chapter of the Examination, "The Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World." Mill was evidently very pleased with this chapter, and a few years after its first appearance he reprinted it unchanged as an appendix to his edition of his father's Analysis. Bain, too, was impressed by Mill's discussion, and wrote in reference to it, "I give him full credit for his uncompromising Idealism, and for his varied and forceful exposition of it" (Bain (1882), p. 120). Some critics, however, were less flattering; James M"Cosh, for instance, scornfully classed Mill's theory with the "wire–drawn attempts to fashion all our ideas out of one or two primitive sources by means of association," which were among the more baneful products of the tradition of Locke (M"Cosh, p. 21). But many of Mill's readers from early days to the present have noted that it is actually far from easy to be sure just what view of the external world he intended to maintain, and, indeed, whether he really had a firm view at all. R.F. Anschutz has claimed that he was trying to be all things to all men, and to satisfy both the Berkeleian and the realist (Anschutz (1953, p. 178); Alan Ryan holds that he simply could not make up his mind whether he intended to deny the existence of the external world or not (Ryan (1974), p. 222).