Repository | Buch | Kapitel
On self-reference and self-description
pp. 189-197
Abstrakt
Let us assume that our world is discretely organized, and that it is governed by constructive, i.e., effectively computable, laws [1]. By that assumption, there exists a "blueprint", a complete set of rids or laws governing the universe. This seems unlike mathematics for which Gödel, Tarski, Turing and others proved that no reasonable (i.e., strong enough and consistent) formal system will ever be able to prove all true well-formed statements. Indeed, Chaitin showed that certain mathematical entities are as random as a sequence produced by the tossing of a fair coin [2, 3]. Hence, let us contemplate the assumption that, when it comes to an enumeration of laws and initial values, nature is finitely "shallow" while mathematics is infinitely "deep" [4].
Publication details
Published in:
Carsetti Arturo (2000) Functional models of cognition: self-organizing dynamics and semantic structures in cognitive systems. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 189-197
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9620-6_12
Referenz:
Svozil Karl (2000) „On self-reference and self-description“, In: A. Carsetti (ed.), Functional models of cognition, Dordrecht, Springer, 189–197.