The focus of this volume is on the intricate relation between self-consciousness, memory, the body, and personal identity. As its title suggests, it considers the nature of self-identification, and also — with Wittgenstein — questions whether there is a self. Its most distinctive claim is that personal memory is central both to personal identity — as many have recognised — and to self-consciousness. It follows that one must address the questions of self-consciousness and personal identity together. The question of self-consciousness concerns what self-consciousness consists in; its relation to the ability to self-refer, expressed by means of "I"; and to self-knowledge, through such faculties as memory and bodily awareness. The question of personal identity concerns whether the criteria for personal identity are psychological, bodily, or a combination of these; is it memories and character traits, or bodily continuity, that makes me the same person as someone who lived twenty years ago? A novel contribution of this volume, I believe, is to draw these questions together, showing their unexpectedly intimate connection. In so doing, it rehabilitates a version of the memory criterion for personal identity, one that it is benignly and not viciously circular.