Contemporary critics see Green's moral philosophy as a reconciliation of opposing, one-sided ethical theories. Geoffrey Thomas argues that "Green offers a cogent alternative to the two standard models of action explanation' — the belief-desire theory and the cognitive model. Thomas also claims that Green "presents a challenge alike to Kantian and to utilitarian constructions of the traditional scheme of motive, action, and consequence'.¹ David Weinstein argues that Green's moral philosophy stands between "Kantianism and Consequentialism' as he "combined a consequentialism of moral self-realisation (of good will) with a vigorous defence of strong moral rights'.² Avital Simhony discusses Green's "relational approach', which "seeks to go beyond dichotomies by simultaneously rejecting the one-sidedness of each side of an opposition and interrelating elements of both into a new perspective'.³ I agree that Green's moral philosophy stands between opposing views, but I point out that this middle position is not unproblematic. Green employs two perspectives in exploring morality and therefore he gives not one, but two definitions of moral behaviour: a formal and a substantive one. Because these two perspectives cannot easily be reconciled, Green finds himself in difficulty when trying to give a single, unitary and non-contradictory definition of the moral ideal.