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The absolute ought and the unique individual
pp. 223-240
Abstrakt
The referent of the transcendental and indexical "I" is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with "the personal I" which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The "absolute Ought" is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in "the truth of will." Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more precise Husserl's ethical position.
Publication details
Published in:
(2006) Husserl Studies 22 (3).
Seiten: 223-240
DOI: 10.1007/s10743-006-9009-4
Referenz:
Hart James G (2006) „The absolute ought and the unique individual“. Husserl Studies 22 (3), 223–240.